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COMPREHENSIVE NO-FAULT IN NEW ZEALAND -
A MODEL FOR ONTARIO?
LEIGH WEST*
RItSUMt
En 1972, la Nouvelle-Z61ande a adopt6 un r6gime d'assurance sans 6gard A la
faute qui a totalement remplac6 le r6gime avec responsabilit6 de la common law
de ce pays. L'auteure discute des forces et des faiblesses de ce regime et s'il
pourrait etre appropri6 A l'Ontario. L'auteure conclut que le r6gime n~o-
z~landais n'a pas 6t6 en mesure d'atteindre ses objectifs et qu'il ne solutionnera
m~me pas les probl~mes qui sont survenus en Ontario avec le regime
d'indemnisation des accidents du travail.
"The visions that fuelled the reforms ...was warm-hearted and humane. It took an
optimistic view of human nature. The basic idea was that those in distress
should be helped, that the well-being of each was of concern to all. Whether the
vision and the efforts made to implement it represent significant social progress
is a matter I leave to more detached observers to assess."
Geoffrey Palmer from Compensation for Incapacity
The debate surrounding the merits of no fault universal insurance schemes has
been an ongoing one for over twenty years. Proponents of the schemes claim
they are efficient, cheaper, speedier and provide more universal justice.' Critics
maintain such schemes have hidden costs, lack flexibility, provide no incentives
for deterrence and may be unfair in individual cases. Lawyers, academics,
Copyright © 1994 Leigh West. Leigh West is an Associate Professor of Law at the Uni-
versity of Windsor.
1. Proponents of universal no-fault include T. Ison, The Forensic Lottery (London: Sta-
ples Press 1967); G. Palmer, Compensation for Incapacity (Wellington: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1979); H.J. Glasbeek and R.A. Hasson, "Fault - The Great Hoax" in L. Klar
(ed), Studies in Canadian Tort Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1977); P. Weiler, Protect-
ing the Worker from Disability: Challenge for the Eighties, (Toronto: Ontario Govern-
ment Printer 1983).
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politicians, worker compensation experts, employers and workers have argued
endlessly about the implications of such schemes. Given the political and
economic climate of the nineties when restructuring of many of our institutions
is underway, it is perhaps appropriate to reintroduce the subject for a second
look.
Ontario's adoption of a no fault auto insurance plan brings it a step closer to a
universal no fault compensation scheme. An Ontario Task Force has recom-
mended that the Province begin long term planning for the eventual introduction
of a universal disability compensation program. 2 As a medium term objective,
the Slater Report recommended a universal accident compensation plan which
would include compensation for all accidental injuries. More recently, rising
costs, problems in the compensation of occupational disease and alleged wide-
spread abuse in the Ontario worker compensation system have led to renewed
calls for a complete revamping of the worker compensation regime in Ontario.
Conveniently for Ontario, other jurisdictions have experimented with various
forms of universal coverage. Already New Zealand, in particular, has pioneered
for twenty two years with a comprehensive no fault accident insurance scheme
which has provided a wealth of information and experience for other jurisdic-
tions to examine. The successes and failures of the New Zealand experiment
provide a useful starting place for an examination of universal comprehensive
accident insurance coverage in Ontario.
There are a number of reasons why the drive to initiate comprehensive no fault
insurance in Ontario exists. A major factor for some commentators is a human-
itarian one. Why is it, commentators ask, that persons injured in the workplace
or in traffic accidents should be compensated for their injuries, while victims of
the ordinary mishaps of life are not? A fractured skull, whether incurred by a
fall in the bathtub or by a blow to the head on a construction site is equally
devastating to the victim. Cancers caused by exposures to toxic substances in
the neighbourhoods of polluting workplaces are no less worthy of compensation
than cancers caused by these same substances within the workplace. Financial
compensation which depends solely on the place or circumstances of the injury
is haphazard justice at best. Incapacitated persons, it is argued, are a community
responsibility and in an affluent and civilized state, the government has both a
moral and a legal responsibility towards all its injured and ill citizens.
A second-factor fuelling calls for reform is the need to contain and control the costs
of worker compensation while still fulfilling the mandate of a Worker Compensa-
2. See Final Report of the Ontario Task Force on Automobile Insurance (Toronto: Minis-
try of Consumer and Commercial Relations, May, 1986) (Chair: Dr. David Slater).
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tion Act to compensate workers when work or work factors make a significant
contribution to the development of injury or illness. The spiralling monetary
cost of worker compensation is a major concern to employers, while the human
costs of uncompensated illness and injury is a grave concern of workers and
their families. The adversarial tensions created by such disparate interests create
conflicts which are governed by expensive and cumbersome adjudication and
appeal mechanisms within worker compensation regimes.
Finally, the present system of worker compensation, in virtually all jurisdictions,
has difficulty in dealing with the compensation of occupational disease. The
problem of determining "work-relatedness," given the scientific uncertainty in
proving a causal link to the workplace, has created controversy and conflict
between the parties. This ongoing tension has led to a call for a new look at
comprehensive insurance plans by way of a Public Inquiry/ Royal Commission
by various groups involved in worker compensation issues. 3 There is here, at
least, some consensus that something must be done.
What is to be done? Implicit in this view of state responsibility are a number of
associated state obligations and functions towards ill and injured citizens. 4
Firstly, the state has some obligation to assist such citizens in coping with
misfortune due to injury or illness through some form of compensation such as,
income replacement, medical care, and/or rehabilitation. Secondly, the state has
an interest in preventing injury by regulation, and by providing incentives to
discourage conduct which leads to injury. Finally, there is the belief that the state
should express some sort of moral judgment about the behaviour causing an
injury in order to satisfy the victim's and society's need for a just result, and to
fix community standards of conduct. 5 This is particularly true where the injury
was caused by conduct other than merely negligent conduct. As New Zealand
3. During the consultation process for the Report of the Ontario Task Force on Occupa-
tional Disease, Ontario Provincial Government Publication, June 4, 1993, which the
author chaired, the Task Force heard several groups and individuals recommend that a
Royal Commission be struck to study the implications of universal comprehensive cov-
erage as a solution to the problems around occupational disease. It should be noted,
however, that many groups and individuals were opposed to such a Commission.
4. These functions are discussed by Richard Abel in a review essay discussing the report
of the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies by D. Harris, M. Mclean, S. Genn, S. Lloyd-Bost-
ock, P. Fenn, P. Corfield and Y. Brittan, entitled Compensation and Support For Illness
and Injury (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). See R. Abel, "Review: £s of Cure, Ounces
of Prevention" (1985) 73 California Law Review 1003. The notion of community/state
responsibility for the welfare of its sick and injured citizens is at the heart of the call for
universal insurance coverage.
5. Ibid. 1003
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has discovered, these associated obligations of the state are occasionally in
conflict with pure forms of universal accident and illness coverage.
The mechanisms available for achieving these goals in Ontario have been a
network of compensation schemes, civil actions, regulatory legislation and
criminal sanctions. These various approaches are intended to compensate vic-
tims, deter dangerous conduct and punish the wrongdoers. The cost and efficacy
of this patchwork approach has been called into question by critics of both
worker compensation and the tort system. The idea of comprehensive no-fault
insurance has been an attractive one to those who believe that the tort system is
irremediably flawed, that the present system of multiple schemes is cumber-
some, expensive and no longer workable and that the chief beneficiaries of
private civil law actions are the lawyers.
This paper proposes to examine the New Zealand scheme in an effort to
determine whether or not a comprehensive scheme, such as exists in New
Zealand, would serve as a useful model in Ontario. To this end, a brief overview
of the New Zealand scheme is given and the circumstances surrounding the
passage and adoption of the New Zealand Accident Compensation Act of 1972
are described. This paper illustrates both the pitfalls and the possibilities that a
New Zealand form of no-fault might bring to Ontario. In particular, it analyses
how well the New Zealand system is able to fulfill the three tasks of compen-
sation, accident and illness prevention and deterrence. Finally, some identifica-
tion of pitfalls and possibilities is made for an Ontario response arising from the
comparisons of the two jurisdictions.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW ZEALAND SCHEME
New Zealand's original no-fault compensation scheme was signed into law
twenty two years ago, on October 10, 1972. It was hailed at first as "visionary"
and has received both strong positive reviews and sharp criticisms. It has long
served as a model for otherjurisdictions which have studied its plan, commented
on its weaknesses and modified its approach. These jurisdictions have basically
backed off implementing so radical a plan,6 so that it remains virtually the only
attempt at a full blown comprehensive no fault regime in existence. The original
New Zealand plan has itself gone through a long reform process which has
6. New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry, The New Zealand Plan, Compensation for
Personal Injury in New Zealand, (New Zealand 1967) (Chair Mr. Justice Owen Wood-
house) [hereinafter the Woodhouse Report), has been examined and studied by Aus-
tralia in July 1974; The Minogue Report into motor vehicle accident compensation in
Victoria, Australia in 1978; The Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensa-
tion for Personal Injury (The Pearson Report) in England in 1978. Ontario's Slater
Report on compensation for motor vehicle accidents makes mention of it.
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resulted ultimately in its repeal and reenactment as The Accident Rehabilitation
and Compensation Act 1992. The major provisions of the new Act came into
force on July 1,1992. Prior to this reenactment, the plan had been subjected to
intensive scrutiny by a Royal Commission and by the New Zealand Law Reform
Commission which produced a number of reports advocating major reforms of
the system. One reform recommended major changes in the scheme, including
provisions which would have covered and compensated sickness as well as
accident by enlarging the range of physical and mental conditions covered. It is
noteworthy that this provision was shelved and never enacted.7 Instead the new
Act clearly reflects the views of the new Conservative Government that the old
scheme had become unfair and subject to a significant level of abuse, and that
the costs of the scheme were not shared equitably. 8 The new Act focuses on
restraining and reallocating costs and redefining and narrowing the broad
definition of "personal injury by accident" that was contained in the old Act.
These changes have made significant alterations to the original accident com-
pensation scheme. The new definition of accident suggests that previous case
law will no longer apply, new policy is in operation and considerable uncertainty
exists as to judicial interpretation in the future.
The New Zealand Scheme-An Historical Overview
The circumstances surrounding the adoption of the original New Zealand
scheme were quite unique. In 1966, a Royal Commission headed by the Hon-
ourable Owen Woodhouse (the Woodhouse Report) was struck to review the
existing law on injury compensation and damages. It concluded that the common
law and existing legislation were outmoded, expensive, slow and unfair. The
findings in the report of the Woodhouse Commission went far beyond a mere
adjustment of the existing system and, in its stead, proposed a radical new
comprehensive accident scheme which included comprehensive coverage of
both workers and non-workers. The new scheme was based on five principles
which were identified as follows:
1. Community responsibility for all persons disabled by accident;
2. Comprehensive entitlement to benefits whatever the cause of the
disablement;
3. Complete rehabilitation;
7. The resignation in 1991 of the Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, one of the architects of
the original scheme, and the subsequent defeat of the Labour Party, killed this reform.
8. These views were clearly expressed by the Honourable Bill Birch in the Budget Supple-
ment No. 6, Accident Compensation - A Fairer Scheme (Wellington: Min. of Labour,
July 3, 1991).
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4. Real compensation;
5. Administrative efficiency.
The Woodhouse Report conclusions, radical as they were, passed into law and
were adopted in the New Zealand Accident Compensation Acts of 1972 and
1973. In order to understand the ease by which such far reaching and path-break-
ing legislation came into effect, and in order to contrast it with the present
political and social climate in Ontario, it is helpful to examine the political and
social climate in which it arose in New Zealand.
A major factor in the speedy acceptance of the Woodhouse Report was the
widespread agreement in New Zealand that reform of the existing personal
injury law was long overdue. Moreover, the view that responsibility for com-
pensation lay with the community was already widely accepted and had histor-
ical antecedents in New Zealand's social history. Therefore, the call for a
comprehensive review of the situation was very welcome.
Prior to 1972, New Zealand worker compensation legislation was in dire need
of reform. An injured worker could either bring a private action for damages or
make a claim for subsistence level benefits under the Act. Since benefit levels
were very low there was considerable incentive to bring an action and if the suit
failed, the worker could then subsequently resort to worker compensation
benefits. This system, which was run by private insurers, was widely acknowl-
edged to be inefficient, out of date, time-consuming and expensive. Coupled
with discontent with the worker compensation system there was also great
interest in devising a form of no-fault auto insurance coverage which would
extend some benefits to victims of automobile injury. Given the consensus on
the need for reform of worker compensation and the principle of community
responsibility to relieve the burden of accidental injury, the stage was set for the
possibility of a universal comprehensive form of insurance which would encom-
pass and go beyond both.
The Woodhouse Commission, mandated to study and advise on the state of
personal injury compensation in the worker compensation field, inherited and
utilized a long and distinguished body of legal criticism outlining the
weaknesses and inadequacies of the tort system. A most compelling portion of
the Commission's Report was the devastating attack on the abysmal failure of
the common law system to compensate victims fairly, quickly and reliably.
Given the Report's dramatic recommendation to abolish the tort system and replace
it with a no-fault scheme, it was absolutely necessary and crucial to the acceptance
of the proposals that the tort system be completely discredited. As Geoffrey Palmer
points out in his analysis of how and why the reforms were adopted, this unrelenting
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focus on the flaws of the tort system was strategically necessary as the success
of the proposed comprehensive plan hinged on diverting money from the
existing system to the comprehensive plan. 9 Little empirical data existed to
substantiate the attack on the tort system and Palmer himself admits that the Report's
treatment of the common law system was "unbalanced" and "one-sided."' 0 No
attempt was made to canvas or discuss the implications of doing away with private
actions. A dual system of tort and some form of no-fault was simply assumed to be
too expensive and the abolition of the tort system became inextricably linked to the
advent of the no fault system.
A second factor in the easy passage of so radical a scheme is New Zealand's
proud tradition of being boldly experimental in the adoption of progressive
social policy."I Historically, New Zealanders were proud to have been in the
forefront in adopting legislation for industrial reforms, for nationalization of
banks and for early suffrage for men and then for women. 12 When the Wood-
house Report recommendations were made public, they were praised by many
in the press as continuing in the long tradition of social reform and advanced
social legislation. 13 Radical reform appealed to and enhanced the image New
Zealanders had of themselves as possessing a strong social conscience.
In addition, this radical social insurance program was brought in by a Conser-
vative government, thus preempting any significant opposition from the Labour
Party, who were ideologically more identified with, and sympathetic to, radical
reform. As a result, since the Government must always have a majority in the
New Zealand House of Representatives, there was virtually no political oppo-
sition to the plan. Moreover, the passage of the legislation was eased by the fact
that in the early 1970's New Zealand had a unicameral legislature and a strong
9. See G. Palmer, supra, note 1. Palmer has stated: "Strategically it was essential to the
Woodhouse style of reform that a compelling case be developed against the common
law. If the common law system survived, a comprehensive system of compensation for
injury was unattainable. If the common law remained, the financial logic of the reform
was destroyed-new sources of revenue would be needed rather than making better use
of the existing money."
The defects of the common law damages system were also well documented by the
Ontario scholar T.G. Ison, supra, note 1 in Chapter 2.
10. Ibid. 35.
11. See W. Hodge, "No-Fault in New Zealand: It Works" (1983) Insurance Law Journal
223; and see K. Sinclair, A History of New Zealand (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Pen-
guin Books, 1959).
12. For a detailed account of these events see K. Sinclair, ibid.
13. See Palmer, supra, note 1 who cites the response to the report by the various newspa-
pers.
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central government patterned after the British Parliament. Party loyalty was
expected, and once the Conservative government decided to adopt the new
scheme they could expect even the most unenthusiastic party members to come
into line in support of the plan. 14 Even the New Zealand bar, which could have
been expected to be apprehensive about losing its role in personal injury
litigation, did not raise strong opposition. After some initial dissent, the bar
supported and eventually approved the bill. Therefore, opposition to the scheme
was minimal, and the opportunity for a comprehensive no-fault scheme was
presented and seized without the benefit of any detailed cost-analysis and even
without an informed and sustained debate of all the ramifications of dismantling
the common law tort system and opting not to reform the existing worker
compensation system.
The Operation of the Scheme
The New Zealand scheme is based on two major premises: it strives to establish
some form of compensation for all earners, all persons who suffer motor vehicle
injury, and all other injured persons not covered by these classifications. 15
Secondly, it completely abolishes tort actions. Included in the tort actions
abolished are occupier's liability, product liability, nuisance, medical malprac-
tice and strict liability. Interestingly, private actions for punitive damages have
survived, notwithstanding the bar.16 Claims for stress and mental injury are not
covered by the Act unless physical injury is present. 17 Occupational disease is
compensated if it arises out of or in the course of employment and if it meets
specific criteria. All other diseases are excluded under the present Act. Unlike
the old Act which relied on a broad definition, the new Act has specifically
defined "accident", "personal injury", and "medical misadventure".
The no-fault compensation scheme is administered by a semi-independent
Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Corporation (the ACC).
It is funded by levies on four groups: earners, motor vehicle owners, employers
and health professionals. While the previous regime emphasized that the Act
was not an insurance scheme and that it was philosophically grounded in
14. See Palmer, supra, note 1 at 63.
15. Illness is not covered.
16. See Donselaar v Donselaar [1982] 1 NZLR 97, confirmed in Auckland City Council v
Blundell [1986] 1 NZLR 732.
17. Previous to this reform, established case law made compensation available for mental
trauma even where no physical injury was present and this included compensation for a
spouse who witnessed the sudden death of a partner. The new definition of "personal
injury" in section 4(1) restricts cover to death or physical injuries including mental inju-
ries arising as an outcome of those physical injuries.
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conferring rights to the injured supported by taxes exacted by the authority of
law, 18 the new Act establishes an insurance-based scheme to rehabilitate and
compensate in an equitable and financially affordable manner. 19 In another
significant change, provision is made for experience rating for all four groups.
Assessments on these groups may be adjusted according to the actual cost of
the injuries. The system may include no-claims bonuses, increased premiums
or claim thresholds.
In summary, the history of the New Zealand scheme has been a unique lesson
in social policy. The experiment itself has been a courageous and innovative
one. However, the new reforms have been very controversial, and the original
intent of the Woodhouse Report has been radically altered. Geoffrey Palmer,
who guided the plan in its early stages states that the plan was initially anchored
in fundamental social principles but has now been "cut loose from its moor-
ing." 20 Sir Owen Woodhouse charges that the New Act has reverted back to what
New Zealand had originally and he is sharply critical of the move to experience
rating. 2'
Pitfalls and Possibilities
The New Zealand scheme has run into its share of problems in meeting the goals
necessary to respond to the compensation of injuries and illness. The goals of
compensation, deterrence and the making of moral judgments are to some extent
contradictory. The problems faced by New Zealand are particularly instructive for
jurisdictions contemplating comprehensive plans. It is useful to analyse the perfor-
mance of the New Zealand scheme in meeting these goals, in order to illuminate
the problems which Ontario would have to resolve.
1. The Compensation Function
One of the ways to evaluate the success of the compensation function is to
determine whether or not the public is satisfied with the service provided.
Based on the New Zealand experience the compensation function appeared
to be widely accepted and approved by the general public, at least until
recently. 22 Client satisfaction surveys conducted for the Accident Compen-
sation Corporation suggest that there is a high level of satisfaction among
18. See Law Commission Report No. 3, The Accident Compensation Scheme Interim
Report on Aspects of Funding (Wellington: NZLC, 1987) at 11-12.
19. The Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992.
20. G. Palmer, "What Happened to the Woodhouse Report?" (1981) NZLJ 561.
21. Sir Owen Woodhouse, in Western Leader, Friday, February 26,1993.
22. See W. Hodge, supra, note 11 at 222.
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injured persons who have had direct dealings with the Corporation. 23 While
other public opinion surveys have shown that the public is ill informed and
confused about some aspects of the scheme there did not appear to be any serious
opposition to the no-fault concept. However, since the passage of the new Act
in 1992 there has been a new and vociferous wave of criticism from numerous
New Zealanders. Sir Owen Woodhouse has stated that he regards the new
reforms as a "backward step" and that only the employers would see the reforms
as fairer.2 4 Many others have criticized the introduction of experience rating.
Workers and unions complain that the Government has gone too far, even
breaching the "social contract" made with New Zealanders when the compen-
sation scheme was first introduced. 2 5
The compensation of occupational disease is just as difficult in New Zealand as
is elsewhere. The same problems of causation and entitlement which plague the
Ontario system are present in New Zealand. New Zealand's failure to extend the
legislation to all cases of illness has made it less than the comprehensive scheme
envisioned by Woodhouse and Palmer and by Ontario reform advocates.
According to the new government the comprehensive entitlement concept set
out in the Woodhouse Report is simply not affordable.26
Moreover, the claim that cost efficiencies result from no-fault schemes has been
put into serious doubt by the New Zealand experience.2 7 At the outset of the
New Zealand scheme, funds which had supported the workers' compensation
and third party insurance schemes were redirected to support the comprehensive
plan. A levy of 1% of payroll was charged against employers while the self-
employed contributed an amount equal to 1% of net relevant income. The
balance of the fund was to come from a levy on owners of automobiles, general
taxation and the interest on investment income. In 1991 it was determined that
this model was no longer affordable or fair. The new government concluded that
those who benefitted from the scheme were not necessarily contributing their
proportionate share. Prior to the new reforms, approximately 70% of the fund
23. See Report of the Accident Compensation Corporation (Wellington: ACC Publication,
1989) at 19-20.
24. Sir Owen Woodhouse, in Western Leader, Friday, February 26, 1993.
25. Ibid.
26. Sir Owen Woodhouse, supra, note 24 disputes this view. He states that the report on
alternative reform options from the Law Commission president Sir Kenneth Keith has
shot down the claim that cost blow-out is justification for abandoning the original
scheme.
27. The Honourable W.F. Birch, supra, note 8. The cost of the scheme has increased by
25% per year between 1985 and 1990.
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came from the employer and self employed levies28 and there was increasing
frustration and concern arising from large increases charged against these
groups.29 Accelerating medical costs and perceived abuses of the scheme were also
seen as having contributed to the increased expenditures. A major focus of the 1991
white paper was on spreading the premiums more fairly. To achieve this the new reforms
set out a series of separate accounts. 30 As a result of this new accounting, the average
Auckland family paid $424 annually in accident compensation levies in 1993.31
Since 1975 there has been serious erosion of the reserve and a rapidly escalating
rate of expenditure, far outstripping the cost of inflation. These escalating costs
have been a matter of great concern and the subject of serious study.32 While it
is true that the proportion of funds paid out to injured persons has remained at
over 90%, 33 administrative costs overall have been higher than expected.
Moreover, indirect costs, which do not appear in the financial reports but which
make up a sizeable percentage of the true cost of no-fault plans, have been
identified and acknowledged. These costs include the costs related to deterrence
measures and the cost of accident prevention programs. There are also the costs
incurred in monitoring the program and in augmenting the benefits of social
security recipients whose entitlements were perceived as inadequate in light of
the higher levels of the accident benefits. 34 Hidden costs must be taken into
account in determining the true costs of no-fault.
28. Ibid.
29. In 1990, employers' contributions covered nearly 70% of all payments, though less
than 40% of those payments were for accidents on the job.
30. An employer account - which is charged with the cost of all work-related injuries
(other than work-related motor vehicle accidents).
An earners' account - to meet compensation costs, excluding public health care
costs, for non-work accidents other than motor vehicle accidents.
A motor vehicle account - to meet the compensation costs of all motor vehicle acci-
dents, including public health care costs.
A Supplementary account - to meet the costs of all accidents not otherwise covered.
This account is reimbursed directly from government taxation.
31. This figure is based on a one-car household with one worker earning $30,000. A two-
car, two-working adult household earning a combined $70,000 paid $848. These fig-
ures are from Western Leader, Friday February 26, 1993.
32. In a report of the Review by the officials Committee of the Accident Compensation
Scheme (August, 1986) the scheme was said to be so strained by accelerating expendi-
tures that its financial viability was open to question. In the Law Reform Commission
Interim Report on Aspects of Funding 1987, the Commission reviewed the funding of
the scheme and made recommendations.
33. Supra, note 8.
34. See Barbara Rea, "Accident Compensation: A Cuckoo in the Sparrow's Nest of Social
(1994) 10 Journal of Law and Social Policy
2. The Deterrence Function
The second obligation of the state is to prevent or deter conduct which leads to
injury and illness. In theory, at least, one of the goals of the tort system is to
deter careless and negligent behaviour by attributing liability to the person
responsible for the harm done. The consequences which follow from drunken
driving, workplaces maintained without regard for a workers health and safety,
negligence in the production and/or delivery of goods and services, unprofes-
sional and negligent behaviour of doctors, lawyers, engineers etc. are clearly
spelled out. Theoretically, an employer should be discouraged from acting
negligently towards workers by the knowledge that liability would ensue. The
employer would therefore take steps to maintain and improve safety standards
and prevent accidents. Other employers would learn by the example and would
also be motivated to provide safe workplaces, thus establishing minimum
standards of conduct for the community at large.
The success of the tort system as a means of deterrence did depend, however,
on the ability to identify the defendant and on the defendant's ability to pay.
With the advent of widespread liability insurance the assumption that tort
actions deterred careless behaviour was weakened as insurance companies
became liable for wrongdoing. The focus changed, then, to a theory of general
deterrence which was based on the premise that the costs of compensation
insurance schemes would offer some inherent checks on risky activities and
unsafe practices. As well as industry classification differentials, various forms
of experience rating have been created to build incentives into the various
worker compensation regimes. Experience rating has been introduced into the
New Zealand system in the new Act. A "no-claims bonus" rating system gives
employers either a discount or a penalty based on compensation claims and the
size of the business. The legislation provides for similar ratings on earners and
vehicle owners or drivers.
The natural consequence of the no-fault approach is to greatly increase the role
of government in all aspects of administration, accident prevention, education
and retribution.
3. The Educative and Hortatory Function
The establishment of community and individual standards of conduct is a less
recognized, but equally important, obligation of the state. 35 A major criticism
of the tort system is that it is an arbitrary and unreliable mechanism of compen-
Welfare" (1982) 4 Auckland Univ. L.R. 235.
35. This was clearly recognized by Trebilcock in his paper on "Incentive Issues in the
Design of No-Fault Compensation Systems" (1989) 39 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 19.
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sation. However, tort actions also served the traditional tort functions of retri-
bution, deterrence and education, which establish individual rights through the
recognition of tort claims and which monitor employer practices and standards
of behaviour. These functions are absent or have been weakened in comprehens-
ive no-fault insurance schemes as well as in the more traditional worker
compensation schemes. Non-economic values embodied in the tort system have
been lost or ignored, to the detriment of both the individual and of society. Many
commentators within New Zealand itself believe that there is sufficient deterrent
effect in the threat of tort action that they advocate an expanded role for tort
actions in future reforms. 36 The New Zealand courts recognized at an early stage
the need for reintroducing some forms of deterrents when an unanimous Court
of Appeal in Donselaar 37 held that punitive or exemplary damages should be
available.
Margaret Vennell, who was a Commissioner of the Corporation until 1991, has
argued for a return to the common law in a number of areas. She advocates the
introduction of a right of subrogation, enabling the Accident Compensation
Corporation to sue tortfeasors, 38 the reintroduction of product liability 39 and the
necessity of full medical disclosure to the patient. 40 Other commentators have
also called for the reintroduction of some private actions on the grounds that a
tort action, however clumsy, serves as a policing mechanism which highlights
and informs society of the responsibility of the individual citizen or corporation.
They argue that when a tortfeasor is identified publicly, a rough justice results
which, in many cases, satisfies the victim's and the public's need for a formal
acknowledgement of wrongdoing, and provides incentives for the tortfeasor and
for others in society to prevent and avoid the activity causing the harm. 4 1 The
New Zealand no-fault system having sacrificed the opportunity to adjudicate
these issues, has lost the ability to analyse and comment on the behaviours which
led up to the injury.
36. See in particular, C. Yates, "Law Commission proposals for accident compensation:
What place for personal remedies?" (1989) V. U.W.L.R. 29.
37. [1982] 1 NZLR 97 (CA)
38. M. Vennell, "Some Kiwi kite-flying" [1975] N.Z.L.J. 254; M. Vennell, "Unlocking the
turntable" [1975] N.Z.L.J. 227.
39. Vennell, M "Unlocking the turntable"(1975) N.Z.L.J. 227.
40. See M. Vennell, "Informed Consent of Reasonable Disclosure of Risks" [1987] Recent
Law 160.
41. Supra, note 36 at 55.
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However,in New Zealand's new Act, the provision for lump sum payments for
pain suffering and loss of enjoyment of life has been repealed. The acknowl-
edgement that someone has suffered a serious loss and that an injury may have
been caused by someone's negligent or wanton conduct is missing. The individ-
ual becomes a statistic. For the individual, this loss of recognition of their keen
sense of injustice may have serious consequences. 4 2
Clearly, the New Zealand system is not yet a perfect model for the fulfilment of
all the obligations of the state towards its sick and injured citizens. Moreover,
there are still some philosophical and more practical problems which are
currently being addressed in New Zealand. Some of these problems stem from
differing visions of what no-fault insurance is. These diverse perspectives are
also instructive for Ontario.
Confusion of Purpose
A number of contradictory philosophic approaches exist together in the New
Zealand scheme and indeed, in probably any comprehensive scheme. The
original Woodhouse Report envisioned an earnings-related income maintenance
program which would cover everyone. Subsequently, many interpretations of
the intent of the plan were made. Some took a social insurance view of the Act,
others a social welfare view, while still others regarded the regime as a kind of
social contract. 43 Tensions exist as to whether the entitlement to a benefit under
the Act is a privilege, an individual right or a collective right to a social service
paid for by the community and implemented by the state. The goals of com-
prehensive compensation and community responsibility suggest the "collectiv-
ist set of values" referred to by Palmer,44 while the goals of real compensation
and rehabilitation indicate a concern with the individual and the need for
individual solutions.
Some approaches placed the Act within the broad spectrum of social welfare
legislation in which the accident victim becomes a client of the state. No longer
do the victims face the author of their misfortune but they must bring their
complaint to officers of the state who determine entitlement. There have been
bitter complaints that victims are treated similarly to welfare recipients. The
inevitable bureaucratization of the process, which assists in creating a welfare
42. One extreme example of this are the Canadian suicide cases where individuals
aggrieved by the compensation system have left suicide notes claiming the system
drove them to kill themselves.
43. See Colin James, National Business Review (Wellington: Fourth Estate Press Ltd., June
8, 1981) at 9 and see B. Rea, supra, note 34 at 19.
44. G. Palmer, supra, note 9 at 238-240.
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mentality, was recognized as early as 1982 in the Corporation's annual report.
This report acknowledged a "somewhat grudging attitude" toward claimants and
a need to move away from a view of entitlement as a privilege rather than as a
right. Barbara Rea described the confusion between social welfare legislation
and accident compensation as a "cuckoo in the sparrow's nest of social wel-
fare". 45
The New Zealand Federation of Labour clearly regards the compensation
scheme as a contractual right bargained and paid for by the surrender of common
law rights. The scheme has taken on the nature of a social contract in which the
quid pro quo is the certainty of entitlement in exchange for the abolition of the
right to sue. This view has made it exceedingly difficult to explain to workers
that their right to entitlement may be restricted by financial constraints. Labour
was incensed when the new Act abolished lump sum payments for non-eco-
nomic and non-physical loss as they considered such payments a right won by
the initial bargain and not subject to unilateral change. Any erosion of the
scheme which derogates from the 1972 "social contract" is regarded as a
betrayal of labour and is accompanied by a demand for the restoration of private
actions.
Accompanying the increased role of government in a comprehensive no-fault
system are a number of associated problems. A huge bureaucracy cannot fine
tune its procedures easily. The objectives of comprehensive no-fault are broad
in scope, diverse, and sometimes contradictory. Trebilcock illustrates this prob-
lem when he argues that different objectives require separate policy instruments.
He notes the tensions which arise when the tort system is charged with fulfilling
social insurance objectives as well as the functions of deterrence and corrective
justice.4 6 To an even greater degree, universal disability compensation schemes
encompass a number of divergent goals and objectives which result in contra-
dictions and a confusion of approaches.
Lessons for Ontario
If the Ontario government decides to proceed with a Royal Commission or
Public Inquiry on the suitability of a universal disability insurance plan for
Ontario, the following problem areas experienced by New Zealand should be
flagged.
45. Supra, note 34 at 235.
46. See supra, note 35 at 24 and see M. Trebilcock, "The Social Insurance-Deterrence
Dilemma of Modem North American Tort Law" (1987) 24 San Diego LR 929.
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1. The Purpose of the Scheme
In putting in place a comprehensive universal disability scheme the underlying
purpose of the scheme should be clear. The present New Zealand scheme has a
quite different philosophical approach and purpose than did the original Wood-
house Scheme. The Woodhouse scheme had as a central premise, a system of
earnings-related benefits free of all means tests. These benefits were intended
to provide real compensation by way of restitutio in integrum to reflect the
legacy from the previous common law tort system. This was the initial bargain.
The new scheme is much more restrictive and has set up a strict definition of
accident. The goal of real compensation no longer appears to be achievable, and
the right to a lump sum payment for non-economic and non-physical loss has
been repealed. There is a shift to reflect a pure insurance focus, and the hope of
the original Woodhouse Report to cover sickness as well as accident has also
been put aside. The aspirations for the scheme held in the affluent 1970s has
been deemed to be too expensive in the leaner 1980s and 1990s.
2. Public Acceptance
Universal disability insurance has some very strong advocates and some very
persuasive arguments on its behalf. However, it is far from universally promoted
and its introduction will face stiff opposition from a number of groups. Unlike
the unique situation which existed in New Zealand, there is no consensus that
universal comprehensive coverage is needed or that it will be an improvement
over the present system.
In an interesting and revealing study done by Bogart and Vidmar on claiming
behaviour, it was found that a majority of persons surveyed were satisfied with
worker compensation. 47 These people are likely among the approximately 95%
of people who file the straightforward accident claims and who receive swift
and efficient service. Is there sufficient dissatisfaction overall with the current
system to make the transition to a universal disability system viable? Will
workers be interested in a contributory scheme? Is the present discontent in New
Zealand a warning sign?
Significantly, federal and provincial cooperation will be required to design a
scheme which will be truly universal. Interprovincial worker compensation
agreements will have to be modified or renegotiated. Presently, there is no
evidence at all of a nation-wide desire for a comprehensive system. In fact,
British Columbia has revamped its provincial worker compensation system and is
47. W. Bogart and N. Vidmar, "Problems and Experience With The Ontario Civil Justice
System : An Empirical Assessment" in Hutchinson (ed.), Access to Justice (Toronto:
Carswell, t990).
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encouraged by its results. Indeed, New Zealand officials have visited and have
been impressed by the British Columbia model. Quebec also has a unique
system, which is still being tried out. In Ontario, there are still a majority of
labour and management groups which fiercely resist the notion of a universal
regime. Ontario will not be starting out with the clean slate New Zealand had.
3. Cost
The funding of a universal disability scheme will require great innovation and
a clear focus on what the plan is intended to do. New Zealand has pointed to the
key questions : How is the scheme to be financed? Who will pay? What level
of benefits is to be provided? Is there any room for private actions? The
Woodhouse scheme and the plan envisioned for Ontario by Paul Weiler in his
report, and by Terry Ison recommend an earnings related scheme providing the
claimant with income replacement which would as nearly as possible maintain
the claimant's original lifestyle. Ultimately, New Zealand has found this model
to be very expensive and not affordable if sickness were to be covered. Other
jurisdictions have proposed less expensive models which would provide flat-
rate contributions and flat rate benefits which would maintain a minimum level
of subsistence. Currently, workers in Ontario receive an earnings-related benefit
level which is one of the highest benefit levels of any jurisdiction in the world.
Will there be a willingness on the part of workers to pay into a fund or to see
benefit levels drop to secure comprehensive coverage for all if this is deemed
the most appropriate model? Will employers, previously protected from large
assessments because of industrial classification, be willing to pay more if the
more generous model is adopted? Will the new plan, in fact, be more efficient
and cost effective?
In designing a plan, it will be necessary to let go of old notions of worker
compensation rights held by both employers and workers, and move toward a
new format where new agreements and cost arrangements are reached. Is there
the political will to do this?
4. Deterrence
The deterrence function was found to be inadequately achieved in New Zealand
under its original plan, and the new Act has provided for experience rating.
Moreover, the New Zealand government also established a health and safety
agency which has been given both an educative and preventive function. 48 This
48. The Corporation established an Internal Safety Rating System (ISRS) as a way of intro-
ducing systematized loss control, including injury prevention, into workplace methods
and practices. As a result Corporate Auditors have been hired and trained to supervise
the system and offer courses. In 1989, the corporation paid $16,932,000 to fund the
Occupational Health and Safety programme of the Department of Labour, see Report of
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step to further regulate workplace health and safety reinforces the view that
separate legislation is required to achieve the goals of compensation and
deterrence. Trebilcock argues convincingly that even strictly compensatory
schemes must include incentives which promote and encourage safe and healthy
practices and which take into account conduct variables. 4 9 These incentives are
very difficult to design into a comprehensive insurance plan, particularly a social
insurance model.
Experience rating is partially effective in providing incentives to employers to
take measures to maintain safe and healthy workplaces. 50 In Ontario, the New
Experimental Experience Rating (NEER) is designed to provide incentives to
firms to improve workplace safety. Refunds or surcharges are issued to firms in
participating rate groups, depending on the employer's accident record. NEER,
however, is very problematic with respect to the unique issues raised by
occupational disease. Since diseases may have long latency periods and be
partially caused by agents outside the workplace, experience rating becomes
unfair and is unhelpful as an incentive to improve safety. Given that occupational
disease is an area which triggers numerous complaints about worker compen-
sation, this is very problematic. Allocation of costs in industrial disease cases
presents major evidentiary difficulties. 5 1 The debate as to how these costs should
be allocated rages on, with little empirical evidence existing as to what method
of cost allocation is most effective. Yet, incentives which require employers and
workers to take individual responsibility for their activities are necessary to
insure the integrity of the system.
5. The Educative Function in Ontario
A tort action allows the courts to review and comment on societal behaviour and
to set public standards and guidelines of conduct. A comprehensive no-fault
system changes the fundamental nature of the dispute between parties. A former
plaintiff becomes a claimant/victim and the legal process changes from a dispute
resolution function to an administrative function with the victim becoming a
client of the state.52 A growing body of research literature about victims suggests
the Accident Compensation Corporation, March 31, 1989.
49. Supra, note 35 at 20-24.
50. Some new studies in the U.S. have shown that experience rated premiums have signifi-
cantly lowered accident rates. For a review of these studies see D.Dewees and M.J.
Trebilcock, "The Efficacy of the Tort System and its Alternatives: A Review of Empiri-
cal Evidence" [ 1991 ] Osgoode Hall Law Journal, at 128.
51. Worker Compensation Appeal Tribunal decisions express this concern. See WCAT
decisions 398/89 and 482/91.
52. For a comprehensive discussion of their phenomena see L. Nader, "From Disputing to
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that the victim of wrongdoing often has a real need to confront the author of his
or her misfortune. The ability of tort plaintiffs to pursue the tortfeasor in court
and to air their grievances in a public forum, reduces the feeling of powerless-
ness and enables injured parties to assert a right and to assume some control
over their lives. For many aggrieved victims, the actual award of damages or
compensation may be only of secondary importance to their need for justice.
Society as a whole may also suffer from the atrophied role of the plaintiff. A
narrowing of the range of complaints brought before a court limits the role of
the courts as an instrument for social change. Klar makes this point eloquently
in his discussion of what is lost in a no-fault scheme such as New Zealand's in
respect of the flexibility and adaptability of tort law to accommodate new needs
and to set new standards of conduct as society changes over time. 53 As Klar
points out, during the twenty one years where no-fault has existed in New
Zealand, Canadian tort law has evolved and expanded to include many new
protections for Canadians in various personal injury contexts. 54 Where large
groups of would-be plaintiffs are barred completely from the courts, the courts
lose touch with- the raw material which provides the social context of the
complaints. The ability of the law to respond to human needs in a changing
society is impaired, as is the ability of courts to monitor and establish standards
of conduct for individuals and groups.
If Ontario were to expand the scope of the worker compensation system to
encompass medical misadventure, product related injuries, environmental inju-
ries and risky sporting and recreation endeavours as has been done in New
Zealand, the ability to respond to changing activities would be impaired.
Even within our present worker compensation system, the inability of some
injured workers to confront the egregious misconduct of some employers who
have knowingly failed to inform workers of occupational hazards in the work-
place has led to real strains on the worker compensation system. The availability
of punitive damages in New Zealand courts for such cases highlights the need
to design a comprehensive system which will allow recognition of intentional
employer misconduct. The push for a return to some private actions suggest that
in any Ontario regime, careful attention should be paid to the possibility of
Complaining" in Black (ed.), Toward A General Theory of Social Control (New York:
Academic Press, 1984).
53. See L. Klar, "New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme: A Tort Lawyer's Per-
spective" (1983) 33 Univ. of Toronto L.J. at 105-107; and see Nader, supra, note 52.
54. Klar, ibid. at 106-107. Klar cites several examples of the evolution of tort law in recog-
nizing the rights of medical patients, athletic participants, penitentiary inmates etc.
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retaining personal injury suits in certain areas. Trebilcock and Deewees have
already done some empirical work which points to the areas most suitable for
private actions. 55
6. The Scope of the Reform
In a recent paper, Harry Beatty examines the reasons why so little progress has
been made towards a comprehensive plan. 56 He makes a case for moving beyond
the intermediate step envisioned in the Slater Report, and argues that planning
for total comprehensive disability compensation should begin. He sketches
some stategies for reforming the entire compensation system which would
require a harmonization and rationalization of numerous plans, which vary in
their funding, coverage, eligibility rules, delivery mechanisms and other fea-
tures. 57 Given the broad based and radical revamping which would be required
for such an undertaking, it is interesting to ponder whether the notion of a
minimum guaranteed income should be revisited. The report of the MacDonald
Royal Commission58 advocates the replacement of all compensation and wel-
fare schemes with a universal income security program. While such an exami-
nation is far beyond the scope of this paper, it certainly is a logical inquiry for
those who would compensate for all incapacity immediately, skipping Slater's
intermediate step.
CONCLUSION
What can we learn from the New Zealand experience? Clearly, existing com-
prehensive insurance schemes are not a panacea for all the ills of the Ontario
system. The goals of fair compensation, cost effectiveness, deterrence, accident
prevention and standard setting have only been partially met. The thorny
problems of occupational disease and abuse of the system that have been
problematic in Ontario and which have been the impetus for the call for reform,
have not been addressed at all. What New Zealand has provided is a map of the
difficulties and obstacles that must be overcome in order to achieve an improved
system. If Ontario is to proceed to a comprehensive entitlement scheme covering
illness, howsoever caused, and at a benefit level that is both fair and affordable,
55. See D. Dewees and M. Trebilcock, supra, note 50 at 128.
56. H. Beatty, "Comprehensive Disability Compensation in Ontario: Towards an Agenda"
(1991) 7Journal of Law and Social Policy at 100.
57. Ibid. 100-101. The most important of these plans include : Family Benefits, Gains-D;
Worker's Compensation; Long term disability insurance; Canada Pension Plan disabil-
ity insurance; Ontario Motorist Protection Plan and personal injury tort awards.
58. Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects
for Canada (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1985) (Chair: Donald Macdonald).
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it will be pioneering in new territory and will become the first truly comprehens-
ive scheme in the world.
New Zealand, while a pioneer in universal comprehensive insurance coverage,
is still in the process of fulfilling (or for some destroying) the vision of the
original Woodhouse Report. The stimulus which existed in the 1970's creating
the political will to experiment has slowed, bogged down in problems of cost
and cost allocation. Even the basic philosophical approach has become blurred
with different groups adopting different interpretations and understandings of
the intent of the Act. Politics has entered the picture and complicated the issues.
Nevertheless, Ontario has much to learn from the New Zealand experience. The
pitfalls have been pointed out and the contradictions have been flagged. The
problems to be examined if Ontario calls a Royal Commission have been
exposed and Canadian legal scholars such as Ison, Trebilcock, Dewees etc. have
already begun the debate. Empirical evidence of the efficacy of universal plans
has begun to be compiled. What is needed is the political window of opportunity
to make forward progress.
Universal comprehensive insurance coverage for both injury and illness has
tremendous humanitarian appeal. It is attractive, in part, because it is a change
from the present besieged and beleaguered regime which is increasing seen as
unfair and unworkable by both workers and management. There is no question
that the present system is imperfect-but is universal comprehensive coverage
the proper alternative?
The implementation of a plan for Ontario which will ensure fair benefit levels,
maintain some flexibility for exceptional cases, preserve incentives to deter
negligent and reckless conduct, compensate occupational disease fairly, and will
recognize individual civil rights and individual conduct is a challenge. Are we
up to it?

